General secret sharing schemes comprise a secret dealer and a number of participants. The dealer can randomly generate a secret and then distribute shares of the secret to the participants. Verifiable multi-secret sharing enables a dealer to share multiple secrets among a group of participants such that the deceptive behaviors of the dealer and the participants can be detected. However, in the absence of secure channels, few verifiable secret sharing schemes can simultaneously share multiple secrets at one time. In this paper, we present an information privacy protection and verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme with a simple structure and high security. Each participant can verify correctness of the share distribution process based on public information published by the dealer and guarantee validity of the received share to avoid offering fake information in the process of restoring the original secret. Our performance and security analysis indicate that the newly proposed scheme is more efficient and practical while maintaining the same level of security compared with similar protocols available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information privacy protection has become an important issue in the field of information security, and secret sharing is a promising technology among privacy protection schemes. In real life, it is dangerous to keep some sensitive and important information, such as passwords of opening bank safes or launching missiles, by a single person, because the information is easy to be damaged, lost or tampered. Therefore, it is urgent to establish novel key dispersion schemes. In the custody system, a secret sharing system is established, which is an important method to protect information security and data security. Since Blakley [1] and Shamir [2] introduced a secret sharing scheme in 1979, secret sharing has been extensively investigated in the literature. In a secret sharing The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Corrado Mencar . scheme, the dealer divides the secret into several shares and distribute them among a group of participants. In general, each share alone cannot reveal any useful information about the secret, and some specified subsets of participants are able to re-establish the original secret information in a cooperative manner. Meanwhile, those unauthorized subsets of participants are unable to reconstruct the original secret information.
In recent years, most secret sharing schemes [3] - [6] have strong limitations on the secret sharing process and they can only share one secret at one time among a set of participants, which is of low efficiency, as shown in Fig. 1 . However, another drawback in their scheme is the assumption that both the dealer and the participant are unconditionally honest. In this way, the fraud of malicious dealer cannot be discovered. The deceptive behavior of malicious participants is unavoidable in the process of reconstruction. Verifiable multi-secret sharing enables a dealer to share multiple secrets VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ among a group of participants such that the deceptive behaviors of the dealer and the participants can be detected.
In practical applications, [3] - [6] can only share one secret during one secret sharing process, and they cannot be used to share multiple secrets simultaneously. To solve this problem, Harn [7] proposed a multi-secret sharing scheme that can detect dishonest dealer and vicious participants at the same time. In order to share any set of secrets, each participant only needs to keep a reusable share. Nevertheless, Lin and Wu [8] pointed out that the shortcoming of Harn's scheme is that it needs to carry out a large number, n! (n−t)!·t! , of modular exponentiations and running interactive verification protocol to verify the effectiveness of shares. Chen et al. [9] proposed an alternative (t, n) verifiable secret sharing scheme to avoid the shortcomings of the scheme in [7] . Moreover, Lin and Wu [8] prove that the scheme in [7] was inefficient, because the dealer had to record the shares of all participants, which required the execution of 2n modular exponents to calculate an n-dimensional verification vector for each shared secret. Consequently, Lin and Wu [8] propose a (t, n) threshold verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme, which is designed based on mathematical difficulties in cryptography. The so-called mathematical difficulty problem refers to the problem of large integer factorization and discrete logarithm. In [10] , He et al. pointed out that the scheme designed in [8] cannot resist the deception of participants, because dishonest participants can provide false shares to deceive other honest participants. Chang et al. [11] improved the scheme proposed in [8] . The improved scheme successfully to a new version which overcomes the shortcomings of the scheme in [8] , and is superior to other verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes in terms of computational efficiency. Unfortunately, Huang et al. [12] found that the verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme in [11] could not resist the collusion attacks.
One situation is that the dealer can distribute some false shares to the participants, and the other is that malicious participants deliberately provide false shares to other participants, both of which can result in the secret being unable to be rebuilt successfully. To overcome these drawbacks, several verifiable secret sharing schemes have been proposed in [13] - [17] to resist dishonest dealer or malicious participants. These verifiable secret sharing schemes allow participants to verify correctness of the dealer's share of the distribution phase. At the same time, it also ensures that participants cannot make mistakes in the reconstruction phase. However, these schemes are not verifiable in some specific applications. For the schemes in [13] - [17] , each participant can only verify the share they hold, but not all the shares held by other participants in the distribution phase. This makes it impossible for participants to prevent the sharing of malicious participants from being mixed in secret reconstruction process.
Chor et al. [18] introduced a practical verifiable secret sharing scheme. In a verifiable secret sharing scheme, participants can verify whether their shares are consistent and they can detect fraudulent behavior by dishonest traders. Verifiable secret sharing scheme is a basic tool in cryptographic research [19] . In order to solve the fraudulent behavior of the participants, we investigated deception immunity secret sharing [20] - [23] and publicly verifiable secret sharing [24] . The publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme presented by Junta et al. [24] can detect the cheating behavior of dealers, and it can also detect the cheating behavior of any participant.
Sheikhi-Garjan et al. [19] proposed the threshold verifiable multi-secret sharing based on elliptic curves and Chinese remainder theorem. The challenge of this scheme is to solve equations. It is well known that constructing Lagrange interpolation polynomial is easier to realize than solving equations. The multi-secret sharing scheme designed in [25] - [27] can not avoid the deception of dealer and participants, and its practicability is not high. The verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme proposed in [28] , [29] requires a secure channel for secret distribution, and maintaining a secure channel increases the operating cost of the system.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• To make the shares can be flexibly and securely distributed among the participants, we present an information privacy protection and verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme with a simple structure and high security.
• As shown in Fig. 2 , a set of secrets can be shared at one time and the reality of the received shares can be verified by the participants based on public information posted by the dealer. In addition, the secret reconstruction protocol can also examine the correctness of the pooled shares to accurately recover the original secrets.
• The scheme we designed is suitable for the environment without safe channels. Through a series of theoretical proofs and performance analysis, it is proved that our scheme is information-theoretical secure and more time-efficient than other schemes. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we first introduce some related work to this topic in Section II. Then, a new scheme is proposed in Section III. The security of our scheme is theoretically proved in Section IV. Section V presents the efficiency is evaluated. And Section VI covers the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we mainly present access structure of (t, n)−threshold secret sharing schemes and properties of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes.
A. ACCESS STRUCTURE
Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } be a set of n participants. Let Γ be a set of subsets of P, i.e., Γ ⊆ 2 P . The subsets in Γ are those subsets of participants that should be able to compute the secret. Γ is called a general access structure and each subset in Γ is called an authorized subset.
The method of sharing secret S among the n participants is perfect secret sharing scheme if it can realize the access structure with the following two properties: 1. The secret S can be determined by an authorized subset of participants when their shares are placed together; 2. Nothing about secret S can be determined when the shares of an unauthorized subset of participants is pooled.
A (t, n) − threshold secret sharing scheme can map a secret S to a set of shares which are distributed to n participants P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }. In this way, any t(t ≤ n) participants can reconstruct secret S by putting their shares together but a group with less than t members cannot do so. All the qualified subsets of P form the access structure Γ . The set of minimal authorized subsets of Γ is denoted Γ 0 and is called the basis of Γ , i.e., Γ = {C ⊆ P : B ⊆ C, B ∈ Γ 0 }. In the case of a (t, n)−threshold access structure, the basis Γ 0 consists of all subsets of exactly t participants.
B. VERIFIABLE SECRET SHARING SCHEME
The verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme is a modification of the traditional secret sharing scheme, and it is mainly used to address issues of non-honest distribution center. VSS schemes are designed based on the usual secret sharing schemes with additional verification operations. In the VSS scheme, the dealer distributes not only the shares of the secret but also some extra information about the secret fragments to the participants. Once a member receives his shares, he can verify whether the shares are correct based on the broadcasted information. In the secret reconstruction phase, each participant uses the same method to verify correctness of secret fragments of other members. It can be observed that VSS is able to resist the following two kinds of active attack:
1. Some shares are tampered before being sent to the participants in the secret distribution protocol.
2. Participants submit error shares to the secret reconstruction protocol.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present an information privacy protection scheme based on verifiable (t, n) threshold multi-secret sharing scheme. The design details are presented as follows. Let D be a dealer and P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } be a set of n participants. The secrets to be distributed are denoted as S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S l .
• Initialization phase:
The dealer selects two large primes p, q and computes N = p · q. The dealer randomly selects a prime Q greater than N and an integer g ∈ [ √ N , N ] different from p and q. The dealer publishes {g, N , Q}.
A participant P i randomly chooses an integer SK i ∈ [2, N ] as its private key, and computes PK i = g SK i mod N as its public key. The participant P i sends PK i to the dealer D, and D ensures that for P i = P j . Therefore, we can infer that PK i = PK j .
• Construction phase:
In order to share l secrets {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S l } in n participants {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, we need to ensure that at least t participants worked together to recover l secrets in parallel manner during a sharing process. The design details of the secret distribution process are discussed as follows:
-The dealer D randomly chooses an integer SK 0 ∈ [2, N ] as its private key, where SK 0 is interprime of p − 1 and q − 1. Then, the dealer computes PK 0 = g SK 0 mod N as its public key.
-D computes M such that SK 0 · M ≡ 1modϕ(N ) , where ϕ(N ) denotes Euler function and ϕ(N ) = (p − 1) · (q − 1). Then, D publishes M .
-D computes R i = PK SK 0 i mod N and uses n + l points (0, S 1 ), (1, S 2 ), · · · , (l − 1, S l ), (PK 1 , R 1 ), (PK 2 , R 2 ), · · · , (PK n , R n ) constructs the (n + l − 1)-th degree polynomial f (x) mod Q as follows:
f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a n+l−1 x n+l−1 mod Q VOLUME 8, 2020
-D takes out the n + l − t smallest integers h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h n+l−t from the set [l, Q − 1] − {PK i |i = 1, 2, · · · , n} and computes f (h 1 ), f (h 2 ), · · · , f (h n+l−t ). The final D publishes (h i , f (h i )), where i = 1, 2, · · · , n + l − t.
• Verification phase:
mod N , and then verify the following equation with each other.
If the above equation holds, any t participants can reconstruct S i following algorithm of reconstruction.
• Algorithm of reconstruction:
In order to reconstruct l secrets, at least t participants need to cooperate with each other. Let the participants in
First of all, the participants in A constructed n + l − 1-th degree Lagrange interpolation polynomial using n + l − t points (h i , f (h i )), i = 1, 2, · · · , n + l − t, which are previously published by the dealer and t points (
x + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a n+l−1 x n+l−1 mod Q Therefore, participants in A can share l secrets S i = f (i − 1) mod Q, i = 1, 2, · · · , l.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the correctness and security of the proposed scheme by three theorems. Further, the proposed scheme realizes information privacy protection.
Theorem 1: Verification is successful if the participant P v j follows the protocol accurately.
Proof: If the participant P v j follows the protocol accurately, then we have the following: Theorem 1 shows that if the participant has deceptive behaviors, the other participants cannot pass the verification. This completes the proof. Theorem 2: An adversary cannot obtain any useful information about secret S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S l from public information.
Proof: No matter whether the adversary is an outside attacker or an internal corrupter, they cannot obtain any information about l secrets.
Case 1: It is impossible for an adversary to construct f (x) directly from the n + l − t points disclosed by the dealer, because the number of public points is less than the power of the n + l − 1-th degree polynomial f (x). Thus, the adversary will not get any information about l secrets.
Case 2: If a corrupt participant becomes an adversary, it is impossible to get any information about l secrets. This is reasonable considering that it is difficult for an adversary to solve SK i by using the equation about the participant's private key SK i . For equation PK i = g SK i mod N , given PK i , g, N , it is difficult to get the private key SK i of the participant P i , that equals to solve the discrete logarithm. Similarly, for equation T v i = PK SK v i 0 mod N , given T v i , PK 0 , N , it is difficult to solve the private key SK i of the participant P i . This completes the proof. Theorem 3: The secret S i (i = 1, 2, · · · , l) can not be recovered if the participant in the set A k ∈ 0 is absent.
Proof: From conditions of the theorem, we know that A k ∈ 0 , t = |A k |. We only consider the following situation: when the size of A k is t − 1, the secret S i (i = 1, 2, · · · , l) can not be recovered. Apparently, for a set of participants less than t − 1 in A k , it is also impossible to recover the secret S i (i = 1, 2, · · · , l).
The following equations can be constructed based on the n + 1 − t points (h i , f (h i )), i = 1, 2, · · · , n + l − t, provided by the dealer and the t − 1 points 
. . .
These are systems of linear equations where the rank of coefficient matrices is less than the number of variables, which means that the equations has at least Q answers and the probability for a set of participants less than t − 1 in A k to pick out the genuine {a 0 , · · · , a n+l−t , a n+l−t+1 , · · · , a n+l−1 } is not more than 1 Q . As Q is a large primer, this probability can be ignored. Theorem 3 is proved.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our scheme with the existing schemes in terms of main performance features and computational cost.
When comparing the computational costs of our scheme with those of other similar schemes, we listed the number of the most time-consuming operations in each phase of these schemes. The most time-consuming operation we consider here is the modular exponentiation. Table 1 lists the main computational costs of our new scheme as well as the main computational costs of the other six schemes. As shown in Table 1 , our scheme is the most effective one compared to other schemes in the initialization and construction phases. The efficiency of our scheme is slightly higher than that of the schemes in [19] , [25] - [27] , and lower than that of the schemes in [28] and [29] . The computational costs of these seven schemes are almost the same in the recovery phase. Since we have added conformance tests to prevent cheating between dealer and participants, the verification phase of our new scheme requires more modular exponentiation than the schemes in [19] , [25] - [27] . Such an increase in computational costs is necessary to prevent cheating on dealer and participants.
We also compare the main performance features of our new scheme with other schemes. Table 2 shows that our new scheme has all the performance features. In [19] , participants hold different shares in different rounds of multi-secret sharing, which increasing the storage space of the system. None of the schemes proposed in [25] - [27] can resist deceit between dishonest distributors and participants. The scheme in [28] , [29] cannot implement multi-secret sharing in parallel. It requires a secure channel in the secret distribution process. However, maintaining a secure channel will increase the cost of system operation.
In the view of the above shortcomings, this paper proposed a verifiable (t, n) threshold multi-secrets sharing scheme based on the difficulty of discrete logarithm, which has the following properties: 1) it can prevent cheating between dealer and participants; 2) it does not need to maintain the secure channel in the secret distribution, so that the scheme can be applied in the system where there is no secure channel;
3) It realizes the sharing of multi-secrets in parallel through one-time secret sharing process; 4) it allows participants to reuse their shares in different rounds of multi-secret sharing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The multi-secret sharing scheme provides a practical technique for sharing multiple secrets among a group of participants. Verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes not only share multiple secrets among a group of participants, but also detect cheating by dealers or participants. They are important tools for preserving multiple secrets (such as cryptography keys) and designing secure multi-party protocols. In this study, we present an information privacy protection based on verifiable (t, n)-threshold multi-secret sharing scheme. Moreover, we seamlessly integrate the verification algorithm to our secret sharing scheme so that one can verify the correctness of the shares. The new scheme we designed can be used in the environment without secure channels. We evaluate the performance of the proposed verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme through theoritical analysis and a series of simulations. Results prove that the scheme can provide effective information privacy protection. In addition, we assessed the time efficiency of the proposed programme and simulation results illustrate that the scheme is also very efficient.
